Report on Terrorism and Task Forces 1/11/01
Diane Lane, Portland, OR

The U.S. General Accounting Office in a 1998 report on combating terrorism defined terrorism, counterterrorism and antiterrorism based on a consensus among some of the different agencies responsible for combating terrorism: the Department of Defense (DOD), the State Department, the Justice Department (DOJ) and the Treasury Department. The definitions are as follows:

Terrorism: The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce, intimidate, or retaliate against governments, the population as a whole, or foreign societies in the pursuit of goals that are political, religious, or ideological.

Antiterrorism: Defensive measures used to combat terrorism.

Counterterrorism: Offensive measures used to combat terrorism. 1
The FBI defines terrorism as an unlawful act or threat of force or violence, committed by a group of two or more individuals against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives. The FBI uses counterterrorism to refer to its full range of activities directed against terrorism, including preventive and crisis management efforts. 2

Nationally and federally, counterterrorism measures have been steadily expanding especially since the 1996 Anti-Terrorist Act. The expanded measures include the authorization of more than $1 billion over five years for various federal, state, and local government programs to combat or deal with terrorism in the U.S. and overseas, and the authorization of the Secretary of State to designate groups as terrorist organizations. The designations are decided after analysis of FBI intelligence submitted to the State Department. It is considered a felony to provide any kind of support to such a group even if that support would serve humanitarian purposes. 3

The annual federal budget for combating terrorism is over 5 billion dollars. 4 The FBI budget just for its Counterterrorism program has grown from $78.5 million in 1993 to $301.2 million in 1999.5

According to a 1998 article by Ehud Sprinzak, Professor of Political Science, the huge amount of money spent on counterterrorism measures by the U.S. benefits defense contractors and other commercial interests who are cashing in on a greatly exaggerated threat of terrorism involving chemical and biological agents. The Professor mentioned three examples of such profit in his article: When Dycor Industrial Research Ltd. developed a monitoring system which can detect contaminants such as poison gas in the air, the president of the company admitted to the press that "Dycor is sitting on the threshold of a multi-billion dollar world market." Two members of a scientific advisory panel that endorsed a plan by the Clinton administration to stockpile vaccines around the country would profit handsomely if the plan were enacted. A former chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is on the board of an investment firm which recently purchased a biological product laboratory, "the sole maker of an anthrax vaccine". The lab has a contract with the Pentagon and expects future contracts with international buyers.

Sprinzak stated that the more than 40 U.S. federal agencies involved in combating terrorism, including the Pentagon, also benefit from big counterterrorism spending. Those agencies claim that anyone is capable of using chemical and/or biological weapons to the extent of taking out a major city. But, as Sprinzak pointed out in his article, over 30 years of field research indicates the likeliness of this is quite low due to several factors. One is that most terrorists use violence to bring public attention to what they think is a vital issue needing immediate political change. The public will hardly be sympathetic to a cause advocated by a group responsible for killing thousands of people. Another factor is that it takes time for terrorists to build up to justifying the use of violence and in that time period, they usually do things that make future violent acts predictable by the most inept intelligence entities.

For instance, Sprinzak mentioned that the group, Aum Shinrikyo, which killed 12 people a few years ago by the release of sarin gas, was not an underground group. In fact, the group's intentions were widely known since the leader often wrote about an impending universal violent upheaval. The Aum Shinrikyo failed 6 times in four years to develop the ability of creating a massive attack using biological weapons.6

Although killing 12 people is by no means something to be dismissed, it does not justify the vast amount of counterterrorism programs especially when over 40, 000 people die in automobile accidents every year and there is no evidence of government plans to outlaw vehicles.7

John Parachini, Director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, stated in a lengthy report issued July 26, 2000, in which he analyzed counterterrorism measures in the U.S., that the spending has been vast but not smart.8 He claimed that the huge amount of money is not based on actual need or threat but on vulnerabilities and worst case scenarios.9 And yet many federal agencies and commissions including the FBI regularly ask for more federal funding claiming that terrorism is an increasing threat, despite evidence to the contrary. For instance, according to Parachini's study, most of the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) cases the FBI investigated in recent years were anthrax hoaxes.10

Louis Freeh, the Director of the FBI, stated in 1999, "We are fortunate that in the nearly six years since the World Trade Center bombing, no significant act of foreign-directed terrorism has occurred on American soil."11

According to the Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, there were 51 terrorist incidents in 1982, 2 incidents in 1997, 3 in 1996, 1 in 1995 and 0 in 1994.12 And yet the Clinton administration is requesting $9.3 billion for fiscal year 2001 to combat terrorism.13 Also in May of this year, President Clinton approved $300 million to expand counterterrorism programs, which will also enable the amount of state and local Joint Terrorism Task Forces to increase from 26 to 37.14 According to Janet Reno, the Attorney General (AG), the FBI has established Joint Terrorism Task Forces in several major cities composed of state and local officials, in addition to local representatives from the FBI AND other federal agencies such as the BATF, the Secret Service, the INS and the Custom Service. All members hold security clearances to share information and investigate terrorist activities.15 According to Reno, the FBI has the authority to establish such task forces because it is the lead agency for responding to acts of domestic terrorism. The creation of the task forces is part of a "comprehensive approach to all states which will help prevent, deter, and respond to terrorist threats by collecting, analyzing and disseminating intelligence broadly and consistent with security concerns."16

According to Louis Freeh, the Joint Terrorism Task Forces also include members of other federal agencies such as the CIA, the State Department, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, the Postal Inspection Service and the IRS. Freeh recently stated that "The 5-Year Interagency Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Plan supports further expansion of FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces where warranted by assessments of activity." (emphasis added) 17

What kind of terrorist activity triggered the formation of such a task force here in Portland? One of the Portland FBI agents mentioned the "torching" of police cars sitting in a parking lot this summer and that there had been half a dozen terrorist type incidents in the area.

In October 1996, members of a terrorist group known as the Phineas Priests who are affiliated with the Christian Identity Church famous for its opposition to, among many things, mixed-raced couples and abortion, were arrested in Portland by the FBI for attempted bank robbery. Prior to arrest, the Priests used diversionary tactics such as pipe bombings at locations close to targeted banks in Spokane, leaving letters behind expressing their extreme religious beliefs, which support acts of violence.18

According to a report by SBC Com Online in March 1998, the Portland Metro area police received terrorism training involving a, "Soldier and Biological Chemical Command" training course per Public Law 104-201. The training was provided by the FBI, FEMA, DOE, EPA, DHH and the Department Of Defense, further blurring the line between the police, federal law enforcement and the military. The report indicated that the need for such training included a 1984 terrorist incident involving the use of salmonella bacteria placed in salad bars in restaurants by the Rajinesh Religious Group which sickened 750 people.19

In September of 1999, the Oregonian did a four part series entitled, "Crimes in the name of the environment. Eco-Terrorism Sweeps the American West." According to this lengthy report, "Arson, bombings and sabotage in the name of saving the environment and its creatures have swept the American West over the last two decades and Oregon is increasingly the center of it all. At least 100 major acts of such destruction have occurred in the West since 1980, causing $42.8 million in damages." The newspaper based such statements on its examination of police, government, and court files. Most of the incidents involve arson, some using incendiary devices and pipe bombs to destroy property such as the Vail Ski Resort because of its plans to expand, which could have a harmful affect on the lynx. No one was harmed or killed in any of these acts of so called eco-terrrorism.

According to the series, the incidents occurred in eleven Western states and included acts such as the release of animals kept in mink farms and research institutes. The series pointed out that even though there is a federal law called the Animal Enterprise Act, passed in 1992, which prohibits the physical disruption of an animal enterprise, and individuals have been prosecuted under arson charges, some political figures such as U.S. Senators Orrin Hatch and Dianne Feinstein as well as U.S. Representative Helen Chenoweth are pushing for tougher federal laws and more FBI involvement in combating the property damage they refer to as ecoterrorism.20

Apparently the FBI is growing more concerned with the arson allegedly perpetrated by some environmental and animal rights activists and is indeed labeling it as domestic terrorism. Freeh stated in February, 1999, that,"The most recognizable single issue terrorists at the present time are those involved in the violent animal rights, anti-abortion, and environmental protection movements." He specifically calls attention to the arsons and property damage claimed by the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and the Earth Liberation Front (ELF).21 It is interesting to note that although all of the law enforcement personnel, politicians and business owners interviewed and quoted in the Oregonian series expressed grave concern for the damage to property, there was no evidence of concern regarding the activists who were injured or killed in their quest to protect natural resources such as the death of David Chain, an Earth First! activist who died when a Pacific Lumber Company logger felled a nearby tree, and the bombing of Judi Bari. which shattered her pelvis and damaged her spine.

Although the Oregonian does mention the 2 incidents, they are cited as an interruption of the onslaught of eco-terrorism and a possible motive for the incidents, respectively. The newspaper doesn't note that a 10-inch pipe bomb was found in the mailbox of the Forest Guardians in March 1999.22

It is possible then that the FBI could be using the above mentioned incidents to justify the formation of the Portland Joint Terrorism Task Force, especially when the FBI Director claims that although the number of terrorist acts has decreased, the ease of obtaining chemical and biological weapons makes a major incident much more likely. He made such a claim immediately after referring to the violent actions by animal rights and environmental activists.23 This elucidates the point made by John Parachini that counterterrorism measures are based on worst case possibilities rather than actual past incidents. Also, the interpretation of certain criminal acts, though covered by other laws, as acts of terrorism further exacerbates the illusion that the threat of terrorism is worth the billions of dollars spent fighting it.

In the spring of 2000, the U.S. Justice Department sent out assessment application forms to all fifty states. Local jurisdictions, (including Portland most likely), were instructed to fill the forms out in order to assess the local terrorist threat, assess vulnerable targets such as government structures and public utilities, and compare the threats and targets to the jurisdiction's current counterterrorism and antiterrorism resources such as those needed by first responders (emergency medical units, fire departments, police, etc.) This process helps to decide how to divide up the multimillion dollar DOJ grant money among states and local jurisdictions, and is also part of a domestic preparedness program by the DOJ which will reach 120 major cities in the U.S.

The terrorist threat assessment section was prepared by the FBI and is interested in only terrorism involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). According to the form, WMD include conventional weapons such as bombs and incendiary gases as long as they have the ability to cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of people.24 The following language is on the assessment form: "If your jurisdiction is a member of a FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force or a Joint Terrorism Working Group, this would be the appropriate venue for the assessment process, especially in light of the pre-clearance to review sensitive information and the FBI's participation in each group."25 The local jurisdictions are not supposed to identify the Potential Threat Element's (PTE) on the assessment form; however, they can keep the information in their files for reference.26

According to the tool kit instructions, Domestic Terrorism has the following definition:

The unlawful use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a group or individual based and operating entirely within the United States or Puerto Rico, without foreign direction, and whose acts are directed at elements of the U.S. Government or its population, in the furtherance of political or social goals.27

The police in local jurisdictions are instructed by the form to identify no more than 15 PTE's which are defined as:

Any group or individual in which there are allegations or information indicating a possibility of the unlawful use of force or violence, specifically the utilization of a Weapon of Mass Destruction, against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of a specific motivation or goal, possibly political or social in nature.

The following is added after the above definition: "Note: This definition provides sufficient predicate for the FBI to initiate an investigation."28

Each PTE is to be given a threat factor which ranges from 1 to 10 for each of the following categories:

Existence - (If the PTE exists it gets 1 point.) The form defines "existence as follows: "The presence of a group or individual, operating within the jurisdiction in which there are allegations or information indicating a possibility of the unlawful use of force or violence, specifically the utilization of a WMD, against persons or property, to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of a specific motivation or goal, possibly political or social in nature.
History - (If the PTE has a history of terrorist activities it gets 1 point)
Intentions - (If the PTE has terrorist intentions, it gets 2 points)
Capability - (If the PTE is capable of terrorism acts using WMD, this includes merely an ability to acquire, store and deliver WMD), it gets 2 points)
Targeting - (If the PTE has picked certain targets for acts of WMD terrorism, it gets 4 points)29

Such concentration on WMD terrorism by the Justice Department is interesting if you consider studies such as the one by John Parachini, mentioned above, in which he reports that unconventional weapons such as chemical and biological agents (included in WMD definition) are an unlikely choice by terrorists, based on research about terrorist acts.30

The primary duty of a Joint Terrorism Task Force is the investigation of terrorist activity. Here in Portland, the ordinances recently passed unanimously by City Council indicate that the task force must follow Oregon statutes for the collection of information on individuals and groups if in certain situations the statutes are more restrictive than the FBI guidelines.31 Oregon statute 181.575 states the following:

No law enforcement agency, as defined in ORS 181.010, may collect or maintain information about the political, religious or social views, associations or activities of any individual, group, association, organization, corporation, business or partnership unless such information directly relates to an investigation of criminal activities, and there are reasonable grounds to suspect the subject of the information is or may be involved in criminal conduct. (emphasis added)

In its investigation of alleged terrorists, the FBI follows what is called the Smith guidelines (based on a former Attorney General Smith who modified the guidelines in 1983). Sections of the guidelines pertaining to intelligence gathering are as follows:

Domestic security /terrorism investigation may be initiated when facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that two or more persons are engaged in an enterprise for the purpose of furthering political or social goals wholly or in part through activities that involve force or violence and a violation of the criminal laws of the United States.

[Section III (B) (1)] The standard of reasonable indication is substantially lower than probable cause. In determining whether there is reasonable indication of a federal criminal violation, a Special Agent may take into account any facts or circumstances that a prudent investigator would consider. However, the standard does require specific facts indicating a past, current, or impending violation. There must be an objective, factual basis for initiating the investigation; a mere hunch is insufficient.32

The FBI can initiate investigations in advance of criminal conduct as long as they're not based solely on activities protected by the First Amendment. Such investigations can be initiated if there are statements which advocate criminal activity or indicate an apparent intent to engage in crime, particularly crimes of violence, unless it is apparent that there is no prospect of harm.33

The ACLU quoted directly from the AG guidelines during a statement issued in 1995:

On some occasions the FBI may receive information or an allegation not warranting a full investigation -- because there is not yet a "reasonable indication" of criminal activities -- but whose responsible handling requires some further scrutiny of initial leads. In such circumstances, though the factual predicate for an investigation has not been met, the FBI may initiate an "inquiry" involving some measured review, contact, or observation activities in response to the allegation or information indicating the possibility of criminal activity. This authority to conduct inquiries short of a full investigation allows the government to respond in a measured way to ambiguous or incomplete information.34

According to the ACLU and the Center for National Security Studies, the review, contact and observation activities of an "inquiry referred to above, include the use of informants, physical surveillance, under cover operations and electronic surveillance.35

According to the revised ordinance establishing the PJTTF, the task force is to identify and target for prosecution those individuals or groups who are responsible for acts of criminal terrorism. At the City Council hearing on November 22, 2000, FBI Special Agent in Charge Kevin Favreau stated: "the types of cases involve criminal acts of individuals who are involved in extremist types of activity which we refer to as domestic terrorism which would have some type of federal nexus involved, violations of federal statutes such as the Hobbs Act, intimidations, forcing business out of business through the use of force or violence, arson, things of that nature."36

A violation of the Hobbs Act is considered a federal crime. The Act prohibits persons from depriving or attempting or conspiring to deprive someone (or commonly a business) of their property through the wrongful use or threat of force, violence, or fear, in a manner that affects or could have affected interstate commerce. The term 'property' also includes the right to conduct business, provide service, and any money spent on security measures as a result of being threatened. The violation does not have to intentionally affect interstate commerce.37

A "threat" must be what is considered a "true threat"; in other words, it must be a threat with the specific intent to threaten so that a recipient of the threat interprets it as a serious expression of intent to cause bodily harm or to assault. Such threats are considered against the lives and physical safety of persons and they are not protected by the First Amendment.38 An example of "interstate commerce" could involve a medical facility that purchased supplies made in another state.

Because a violation of the Hobbs Act is a violation of federal law, it constitutes a racketeering act under the Racketeering Influenced and Corruption Organization Act, known as RICO. A person violates the RICO Act if he or she participates in the conduct of the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. There is no need for an "enterprise" to be a formal organization with an economic purpose; it could be a political group. The enterprise or group must have an affect on interstate commerce, which it does if in any of its activities it crosses state lines through either travel, phone calls and/or the U.S. mail. (By crossing state lines this a federal crime rather than a state crime). The "pattern of racketeering activity" is met if at least two racketeering acts (including violations of the Hobbs Act) occur within 10 years of each other. The acts have to be related and continuous and can include the threat of future criminal conduct.39

Cecil Greek of the University of South Florida stated in a report about RICO:

RICO has also been used against both prolife demonstrators (Northeast Women's Center v. McMonagle 1989) and antipornography protesters (Walden Book Co. Inc. et al v. American Family Association of Florida 1989), raising questions about RlCO's possible effect on freedom of assembly (Kilpatrick 1989). In McMonagle an abortion clinic had the Supreme Court uphold a civil RICO suit they filed against anti-abortion protesters who staged four sit-ins at the clinic. Equipment worth $887.00 was damaged during one of the demonstrations after protesters forcibly entered the clinic. The defendants were charged with extortion and robbery as RICO predicates (Melley 1989 5-6). (emphasis added)40

Greek also claims that " some cases one person acting alone can be, charged and one crime (if it violates both state and federal statutes) considered sufficient {to}show a racketeering pattern."41 The Department of Justice Criminal Resource Manual provides guidelines for the criminal or civil prosecution under RICO but makes it clear that " These guidelines do not limit the authority of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to conduct investigations of suspected violations of RICO.42

Portland activists are concerned about the guidelines that the PJTTF will be following in order to gather intelligence. Another concern is whether or not the task force will follow any reasonable guidelines especially since the Portland Criminal Intelligence Unit (CIU) has violated the Oregon statutes by investigating non-criminals such as Dan Handelman and Douglas Squirrel. The investigations were not only a violation of the statutes, but included mistakes such as incorrect names and affiliations. This could lead to, at worst, the arrest of innocent citizens. Also, David Cole, a NY University professor stated in 1996, "By criminalizing those who associate with a group's lawful ends, it deters precisely the people who might have some moderating influence on the group in question."43

By creating the PJTTF, 8 members of the Portland Police Bureau have formed a joint operation with the FBI, famous for its First Amendment abuses. (See Shira Zucker's report for a more detailed historical perspective of FBI abuses.)

Gregory T. Nojeim of the ACLU Legislative Council stated the following in 1995: "Recently, the AIDS activist group ACT UP learned that the FBI had maintained a file of over 100 pages on the group, and refused to make most of the file public.44

The FBI is not the only federal intelligence agency with a record of past abuses: David Kopel, Associate Policy Analyst, made the following statement before the U.S. Senate in 1995:

On February 5, 1993--23 days before the Waco raid--BATF ransacked the home of Janice Hart, a black woman in Portland, Oregon, terrorizing her and her three children for hours, destroying her furniture, slamming a door on a child's foot, forcing two children to wait outside in a car while Ms. Hart was interrogated inside, and refusing to allow her to call an attorney, until BATF discovered that there was a case of mistaken identity. (BATF had been looking for Janice Harold, who bears no resemblance to Mrs. Hart.) In this case, unlike most others, BATF did at least send a check for damages, although no apology was offered."45 This is important because the BATF is one of the agencies listed by Attorney General Reno as being affiliated with local Joint Terrorism Task Forces.

Because such abuses have occurred locally and nationally, before establishing Joint Terrorism Task Forces, it would be prudent to have independent audits conducted of all intelligence agencies and to establish independent civilian oversight of local and federal law enforcement, including the FBI. For instance, San Francisco, well known for its independent civilian police review board, the OCC, also conducts audits (by the civilian Police Commission) of all San Francisco Police Department First Amendment activities, according to OCC Director, Mary Dunlap.46

Two groups recently issued recommendations which would increase the already vast counterterrorism measures. A brief list follows of some of the recommendations from the National Commission on Terrorism mandated by Congress. (It should be noted that an ex-CIA director, an ex-FBI agent and a retired Army general were included in the 10 members of this Commission. Several FBI and CIA current and former agents were listed in the Appendix as being interviewed by the Commission):

-CIA guidelines adopted in 1995 restricting recruitment of unsavory sources should not apply when recruiting counterterrorism sources.

-The President should impose sanctions on countries that, while not direct sponsors of terrorism, are nevertheless not cooperating fully on counterterrorism. Candidates for consideration include Pakistan and Greece.

-Funding for counterterrorism efforts by CIA, NSA, and FBI must be given higher priority to ensure continuation of important operational activity and to close the technology gap that threatens their ability to collect and exploit terrorist communications.

-The President and Congress should work together to create an effective system for monitoring the status of foreign students nationwide.47

The following are just a few of the many recommendations by an advisory panel called the Gilmore Commission which the Secretaries of Defense, Energy, and Health and Human Services as well as the Director of FEMA created by contract with the National Defense Research Institute of RAND to study the issue of Domestic Terrorism:

- Create a "National Office for Combating Terrorism" - Director appointed by the President, confirmed by the Senate

- Improve human intelligence by rescinding CIA guidelines on certain foreign informants (DCI)

- Review/modify guidelines and procedures for domestic investigations

- Provide security clearances and more information to designated State and local entities

- Develop national strategy approved by the President

The Gilmore Commission's report issued December 14, 2000 included an interesting statement:

The terrorist incidents in this country - however tragic - have occurred so rarely that the foundations of our society or our form of government have not been threatened. Conventional explosives, traditionally a favorite tool of the terrorist will likely remain the terrorist weapon of choice in the near term as well.48

The Commission supported the above statement by citing the current difficulties in acquiring or developing, and in maintaining, handling, testing, transporting and delivering a device that would actually have the capability to cause mass casualties.49

There have been other suggestions for combating terrorism besides the escalation of expensive counterterrorism programs. Professor Sprinzak recommended in his above-mentioned article that "psychopolitical" research was one of the most neglected means of countering terrorism. In other words, well-trained psychologists and terrorist "experts" could try to learn the psychological reasons behind using terrorism. According to Sprinzak, "Systematic group and individual profiling for predictive purposes is almost unknown." He claimed that many former terrorists and members of radical organizations are believed to have considered and rejected the use of WMD. Sprinzak suggested that such people could be interviewed and studied to gain understanding about the considerations involved in using terrorism.50

1 Letter Report, 11/20/98, GAO/GGD--997, p.27, (
2GAO report, p.3
3Close Up Foundation, page 8-10, Domestic Terrorism, Jan. 1997, Washington DC, (
4John Parachini, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Testimony before the House Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, July 26, 2000, Figure 1, p. 1, []).
5 Louis Freeh, Director FBI, Statement before the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, February 4, 1999, page 1, (
6 Ehud Sprinzak, professor of political science at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, "The Great Superterrorism Scare", Foreign Policy, September 28, 1998, pp. 110-124, (
7 National Center for Health Statistics, 1998, (
8Parachini, page 2
9Statement of John V. Parachini, p.5
10 Ibid, page 5
11Louis Freeh, p.4.
12U.S. Justice Department, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, page 334, (
13Parachini, p. 9
14Terence Hunt, "President Wants to Spend More to Combat Cyber-Terrorism", AP, , (
15Statement of Janet Reno, Attorney General of the United States before the United States Senate Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, and State, The Judiciary, and Related Agencies. Feb. 4, 1999, pp. 7-8, (
17Louis Freeh, page 10
18David Neiwert, Threat From Within, 10/96, (http://www.msnbccom/new/257143.asp?cpl=1)
19"Domestic Preparedness", SBC COM Online, 3/31/98, (
20 "Crimes in the Name of the Environment," 9/26/99 - 9/29/99, Bryan Denson and James Long of The Oregonian, Portland, (
21Freeh 1999 statement, p.8)
22Outside Magazine, Profile on Barry Clausen, October 2000, Page 5, (
23Freeh 1999 Statement, p.8
24(Office of Justice Programs, State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Program Needs Assessment and Strategy Development Initiative Assessment Form, May 15 2000,, p. 23)
25Ibid, p. 27
26Ibid, p. 28
27Ibid, p. 23
28Ibid, p. 23
29Ibid, p. 24
30Parachini report, p.5
31Memorandum of Understanding, Ordinance passed November 22. 2000, Portland)
32Direct Quote on the Smith Guidelines from the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) letter on FBI Domestic Security Investigations to the U.S. Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Terrorism, Intelligence and Gov't Information, April 26, 1995, p.2)
33EPIC, Washington, DC, p. 2, (
34Gregory T. Nojeim, Legislative Council, ACLU Washington National Office, Statement about the Comprehensive Antiterrorism Act before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, June 12, 1995, p.19)
35ACLU Nojeim statement, p. 20, and the Center for National Security Studies, "The FBI's Domestic Counterterrorism Program", April, 1995, Washington, DC, p.2, (
36Transcript of CC hearing, November 22, 2000, prepared by Dan Handelman of Copwatch. Such testimony was only possible because Mr. Handelman noted the task force items listed on the City Council Agenda for November 22 and asked that they be pulled off the consent agenda.)
37Department of Justice Criminal Resource Manual, 2403 The Hobbs Act, October, 1997 ( and, Transcript of trial proceeding, US District Court for the District of Oregon, PP vs ACLA, 1/26/99, pp. 26-29, (
38ACLU, (
41ibid, p. 10)
42DOJ,/USAM/Title 9 Criminal Resource Manual, 9-110.320, (
43David Cole, visiting Professor at NYU Law School, "Terrorizing the Constitution:, The Nation, March 25, 1996, (
44Nojeim Statement, p. 20
45The Congressional Record, Excerpts From Written Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Submitted by David B. Kopel, Associate Policy Analyst, 1995, p. 16.
46 email interview with Mary Dunlap, December 29, 2000
47National Commission on Terrorism, "Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism", Washington, DC.,
48The Gilmore Commission, "Towards a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism", RAND, December 14, 2000. (
49Gilmore Commission, p.18
50Sprinzak, p.7